学术视界 | 绿色供应链参与行为演化博弈分析——基于系统动力学视角

邵必林胡灵琳数字经济与商业模式 2023-03-28

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绿色供应链参与行为演化博弈分析——基于系统动力学视角

邵必林，胡灵琳

摘要：绿色供应链已成为政企谋求合作的新焦点，而政府如何制定恰当的补贴政策有效引导供应链绿色化以及企业面对政策导向如何做出正确的经营决策是实现共赢的关键。为了深入探究政府与企业参与绿色供应链策略选择的动态过程，客观揭示绿色供应链各方利益主体参与行为的演化博弈关系，为政府合理制定补贴政策提供理论依据，本文在有限理性的假设前提下，通过构建演化博弈模型，分析双方的博弈关系和稳定策略，并运用系统动力学进行建模仿真，明晰了关键因素对绿色供应链政企参与行为的影响路径。研究结果表明：政企参与绿色供应链的行为博弈存在演化稳定均衡策略；利益双方的参与意愿互相影响，政府积极的补贴政策、合理的补贴力度以及企业良好的绿色管理水平、绿色成果质量，对绿色供应链的健康发展均有正向作用；政府补贴存在有效区间，要合理把握力度防止因企业滋生逐利心理而出现负面效应。

关键词：绿色供应链；参与行为；政府补贴；演化博弈；系统动力学

主要研究结论：本文突破传统博弈理论，在有限理性的假设下，运用演化博弈构建政府和企业在绿色供应链中参与行为选择的演化博弈模型，研究绿色供应链双方利益主体参与行为的演化博弈关系。为探究政企参与行为选择的动态演化过程，进一步构建了演化博弈的SD模型，并通过Vensim软件模拟参数不同取值情况下的博弈策略变动及其演化趋势。研究得出以下结论：（1）政府和企业的绿色供应链参与行为博弈存在均衡策略，即都参与或者都不参与。（2）绿色供应链中博弈双方的参与度互相影响，政府积极的补贴政策以及企业良好的绿色管理水平、绿色成果质量，对绿色供应链管理的发展均有正向作用。（3）政府需把握合理的补贴力度，有效防止因企业产生逐利心理而阻碍绿色供应链的健康发展。

A game analysis of the evolution of participation behavior of green supply chain

——A study based on the system dynamics perspective

Shao Bilin, Hu Linglin

(School of Management, Xi′an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi′an 710055, Shaanxi, China)

Abstract:Green supply chain has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises. With the development of market economy, the market competition in the 21st century will rise from the competition among enterprises to the competition between supply chains, which is a higher level of expansion. Supply chain, as the main body of manufacturing system to complete the whole material flow process, plays a vital role in manufacturing activities. Establishing a "green" supply chain is an important means to achieve green manufacturing. Green supply chain management mode is to integrate environmental awareness into supply chain management, increase "green factors" to improve resource utilization and reduce environmental pollution. It is a new development direction of supply chain management. Green supply chain will bring higher production costs to enterprises，including pre-research investment, manufacturing process investment and environmental recovery investment for implementing green supply chain management. Effective subsidy policy formulated by the government can promote the promotion of green supply chain, but at present, most of China′s legal policies are based on planning and guidance. The lack of government subsidy policy which can effectively alleviate the pressure of production cost of enterprises, causes the slow promotion process of green supply chain. For governments and enterprises, how the government adopts appropriate subsidy policy to guide the green supply chain, and how to make the right business decision is the key to achieve the mutual benefit，but also an urgent problem to be solved. Therefore, exploring the game behavior of government and enterprises in green supply chain has certain theoretical significance and practical value.

So far, scholars at home and abroad have carried out extensive research on the game behavior of green supply chain and its related participants. Most studies neglect the role of government and its interaction with the decision-making of supply chain members to varying degrees, or only regard government as a parameter in the game model. Few scholars regard it as a stakeholder in the game model. In fact, the government and enterprises also have game behavior in environmental practice, and the ultimate goal is to maximize profits.

Therefore，this paper takes the government and enterprises in green supply chain as the research object. Evolutionary game theory is often used to study the existence and evolutionary stability of main body behavior. System dynamics can quantitatively analyze the impact path of key factors affecting government-enterprise participation behavior. In view of this, this paper combines evolutionary game with system dynamics model, and assumes the participating individuals are limited rationality to explore the dynamic process of government and enterprise strategy selection in green supply chain. Firstly, the evolutionary game theory is used to construct the behavior of two stakeholders (i.e. government and enterprise) in the selection when they participate in the green supply chain. Then, the evolutionary game relationship of the two stakeholders participating in the behavior of green supply chain is discussed and the equilibrium stability is analyzed. Next, in order to explore the dynamic evolution process of the participating behavior selection of government and enterprise, the system dynamics model is further established. The system dynamics (SD) model and vensim software are used to simulate the game strategy change and its evolution trend under different parameters. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) There exists a balanced strategy in the game of participation behavior of government and enterprise in green supply chain, i.e. both participate or do not participate. (2) The degree of active participation of game players in green supply chain is influenced by the initial willingness ratio. Active government subsidy policy, reasonable subsidy intensity, high green management level of enterprises and good quality of green achievements have positive effects on the healthy development of green supply chain. (3) There is an effective interval for government subsidy, so the government should grasp the reasonable subsidy to prevent the healthy development of green supply chain from being hindered by the profit-seeking mentality of enterprises.

In addition, in order to enable the government to guide enterprises to actively participate in the practice of green supply chain management, so as to better promote the development of green management, this paper also puts forward the following policy recommendations:

Firstly，to formulate a scientific long-term incentive policy to improve the green awareness of supply chain management. At the same time of giving full play to the incentive role of subsidy policy, we should enhance the environmental responsibility consciousness of enterprises, so that both government and enterprises can fully participate in the green supply chain. The government′s subsidy policy and the initial willingness of enterprises to participate in the implementation of green supply chain management are increasing means it is more conducive to achieving the ideal state of maximum profits for both sides and to achieving higher social well-being.

Secondly, creating conditions for enterprises to improve the quality of results and increasing comprehensive benefits. As an incentive in the green supply chain, the government should focus on improving the quality and efficiency of development, create a green environment for enterprises and favorable conditions, catalyze high-quality construction results, and maximize the comprehensive benefits of both sides. In addition, in the process of formulating the corresponding subsidy policy, the government should not only transform the green achievements into promoting policies in time to create more favorable conditions, but also do a good job in relevant research to avoid the loss of profits caused by the improper direction of subsidies.

Thirdly, encouraging the adoption of efficient green production technologies to reduce management costs. As far as green supply chain management is concerned, the relevant management technology of domestic enterprises is still in a backward state. The government should guide enterprises to refer to mature experience, adopt advanced technology, and achieve a high level of green upgrading on the basis of strict control of moderate management cost, so as to form a green supply chain management system with low cost and high profit.

Fourthly, grasping reasonable subsidy input and mobilizing the enthusiasm of upstream and downstream enterprises to participate. The subsidy input has an effective boundary. Only by grasping the strength can we give full play to the positive impact of the subsidy policy on the development of green supply chain.For the situation that the government subsidies are obviously too large, we should adjust the subsidy strategy in time, reduce the input cost appropriately, and focus on optimizing the subsidy cost structure, so as to prevent the negative impact of the original positive incentives from being offset.

Key words:green supply chain; participation behavior; government subsidy; evolutionary game; system dynamics

引用本文：邵必林,胡灵琳.绿色供应链参与行为演化博弈分析——基于系统动力学视角[J].科研管理,2021,42;313(11):171-181.

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